
Re-theorizing Maritime Security: Indigenous Archipelagic Ontologies against Western Sea Power Dogmas in Indonesia

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ABSTRACT

Traditional, Western-centric maritime security paradigms specifically the classical sea power dogmas of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett treat the ocean as an empty Cartesian space designed for naval force projection and commercial command. These orthodox frameworks leave postcolonial archipelagic states epistemically ill-equipped to address their distinct spatial and sovereign realities. Grounded in critical geopolitics and postcolonial International Relations theory, this article re-theorizes maritime security by examining indigenous archipelagic ontologies through the empirical lens of Indonesia. Utilizing a qualitative discourse analysis of foundational state doctrines, executive addresses, and maritime diplomatic records, the study examines how concepts such as *Wawasan Nusantara*, the 1957 Djuanda Declaration, and contemporary diplomatic practice construct an alternative spatial logic. The findings reveal that Indonesian archipelagic ontology rejects Eurocentric zero-sum power projection, conceptualizing the sea instead as an indissoluble "connective vein" *Tanah Air* that unifies terrestrial and oceanic spaces into a holistic sovereign domain. This spatial reframing is operationalized diplomatically through cooperative joint development initiatives such as in the Ambalat border area and administratively via Lukman Yudho Prakoso's IITCA governance framework to optimize Maritime Domain Awareness. Ultimately, this study demonstrates that indigenous archipelagic ontologies provide a post-Western, decolonial framework that prioritizes relational sovereignty and cooperative stewardship over offensive sea denial, offering valuable conceptual insights for postcolonial maritime governance in the Global South.

INTRODUCTION

For more than a century, the study and practice of maritime strategy have been dominated by Western-centric intellectual frameworks that treat the sea primarily as an instrument of great power competition, commercial expansion, and tactical power projection. Before examining these dynamics, it is necessary to establish clear conceptual

definitions to avoid theoretical conflation. In this study, Western sea power and the Western-centric maritime security paradigm refer specifically to the strategic doctrines originating from Euro-American naval traditions most prominently encapsulated by Alfred Thayer Mahan (1890) and Sir Julian Corbett (1911). Mahanian doctrine emphasizes "command of the sea" through decisive fleet engagements and commercial sea control, whereas Corbettian doctrine conceptualizes naval force as an asymmetric support mechanism for continental land operations. These traditions are undergirded by a colonial rationality—an epistemic framework that constructs oceanic space through Cartesian cartographies, treating the sea as a frictionless, vacant void (*mare nullius*) separating discrete sovereign landmasses (Steinberg, 2001; Bueger & Edmunds, 2017).

While Mahanian and Corbettian frameworks have historically been elevated as universal axioms across the global South (McCranie, 2021; 2023), recent critical maritime studies demonstrate that these orthodox dogmas carry deep structural biases tied to imperial history and resource extraction (Lambert et al., 2006; Sharman, 2019). Rather than serving as neutral strategic tools, these classical doctrines were historically developed alongside Western imperial expansion, discursively framing the global maritime commons into zones of exclusive great power jurisdiction and commercial access (Bueger, 2015; Björnehed, 2022). By conceptualizing water as an empty space of non-sovereignty or raw tactical denial, this Cartesian dichotomy stands in stark contrast to the lived historical, cultural, and ecological realities of postcolonial archipelagic states in Southeast Asia (Alfi & Manullang, 2024; Maulana, 2026). This article re-theorizes maritime security by deconstructing these dominant Western sea power dogmas and advancing a theoretically grounded articulation of indigenous archipelagic ontologies. At the core of this post-Western epistemology is the conceptualization of the sea not as a dividing barrier or a vacant highway, but as a cohesive "connective vein" that integrates islands, coastal communities, and marine ecosystems into a unified sovereign entity (Alfi & Manullang, 2024). In Indonesia, this ontology is formally encapsulated in the doctrine of *Wawasan Nusantara* and was historically asserted through the Djuanda Declaration of 1957 (Tsauro, 2017). Utilizing the concept of *Tanah Air*, the archipelagic ontology rejects the artificial separation of terrestrial and oceanic domains, recognizing surrounding and intervening waters as an inseparable part of national territory (Alfi & Manullang, 2024).

This epistemic shift directly shapes contemporary maritime diplomacy, border governance, and policy implementation. Specifically, this ontology offers a novel lens for analyzing how the post-2024 Indonesian administration under President Prabowo Subianto reconfigures maritime diplomacy. Rather than relying solely on legalistic or zero-sum security frameworks, the administration has mobilized a decolonial discourse that frames historical border frictions—such as the Ambalat dispute with Malaysia—not as existential territorial contests, but as inherited "colonial wounds" stemming from artificial Western cartographies (Maulana, 2026). To substantiate this relationship, this study subjects primary policy documents and official diplomatic speeches to discourse coding, revealing how

decolonial narratives are operationally translated into cooperative joint development and resource management frameworks (Secretariat of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). Furthermore, operationalizing archipelagic ontology requires a holistic implementation model. Rather than relying on sectorally fragmented Western models, this article evaluates Indonesian maritime security through Lukman Yudho Prakoso's (2020) "IITCA" (Integrative, Interactive, Transparency, Control, Accountability) framework, combined with advanced Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) digital technologies (Firdaus et al., 2026; Ivanhoe et al., 2026; Febriyanto et al., 2026). Despite the growing interest in post-Western International Relations and critical geopolitics, a significant literature gap remains. Existing scholarship on Indonesian maritime strategy either focuses on technical-diplomatic histories of UNCLOS 1982 or evaluates contemporary defense policy through conventional Mahanian balance-of-power lenses (McCranie, 2023). Conversely, critical maritime studies often remain purely theoretical, failing to demonstrate how indigenous ontologies translate into empirical policy execution and statecraft. Few studies have systematically linked the philosophical foundation of *Tanah Air* to concrete diplomatic discourse analysis and administrative implementation frameworks like IITCA. This article directly fills this gap by providing an empirical and theoretical bridge between decolonial archipelagic ontology, qualitative discourse coding of elite statecraft, and administrative policy evaluation.

To address this gap, this study answers three central research questions:

RQ1: How do traditional Western sea power paradigms (Mahanian and Corbettian) epistemically colonize and marginalize the maritime security realities of postcolonial archipelagic states? RQ2: In what ways does the indigenous archipelagic ontology *Wawasan Nusantara* and *Tanah Air* provide a decolonial, post-Western alternative for conceptualizing maritime space and sovereignty? RQ3: How are these indigenous ontologies practically operationalized in contemporary Southeast Asian maritime diplomacy (specifically under President Prabowo Subianto) and evaluated through holistic policy implementation frameworks (such as Prakoso's IITCA)? By answering these questions, this article contributes to critical geopolitics, postcolonial IR theory, and maritime security studies by offering a robust theoretical alternative to Eurocentric naval dogmas.

METHODS

This study employs a qualitative, critical interpretivist research design rooted in the traditions of critical geopolitics and postcolonial International Relations (IR) theory (Said, 1978; Bhabha, 2004). This methodological approach is uniquely suited for deconstructing the power-knowledge structures embedded within dominant maritime security paradigms and examining how indigenous epistemologies are discursively constructed and operationalized by postcolonial states (Maulana, 2026). Rather than treating maritime security as a neutral, objective set of tactical variables, this study conceptualizes security

policy and strategic doctrines as discourses that actively shape, limit, and construct geopolitical space, sovereignty, and state action (Bacchi, 2000; Björnehed, 2022).

The empirical inquiry focuses on Indonesia's archipelagic discourse and maritime policy evolution over a 69-year temporal scope of the object of study (1957–2026), allowing for a comprehensive analysis of the evolution of archipelagic thought from the foundational Djuanda Declaration (1957) to contemporary digital and diplomatic manifestations (2026). To ensure methodological rigor and replicability, data collection was conducted between January and July 2026 through systematic database searches. Primary legal and policy documents were retrieved from the Official Gazette of the Republic of Indonesia (Lembaran Negara RI), the Cabinet Secretariat Repository, the United Nations Treaty Collection (UNTC), and the official archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) and Ministry of Defense (Kemhan). Secondary scholarly literature was gathered via Scopus, Web of Science, and Google Scholar using targeted boolean search strings combining terms like "archipelagic state" or "Global Maritime Fulcrum" with "maritime security" or "critical geopolitics."

Document selection followed a structured protocol governed by explicit inclusion and exclusion criteria. Textual material was included if it constituted primary legal and policy texts defining the Indonesian maritime domain, official diplomatic artifacts and public speeches delivered by elite actors (operationally defined as Heads of State, Cabinet Ministers, and Naval Flag Officers), official technological, defense, and implementation briefs from authorized state agencies (TNI AL, Bakamla, BIG), or peer-reviewed academic literature analyzing Indonesian maritime security. Conversely, sources were excluded if they were unverified news reports or opinion editorials from non-elite commentators, draft legislation that was never formally enacted, or secondary sources published prior to 2010, with the exception of foundational theoretical texts (e.g., Said, 1978; Bhabha, 2004) and seminal legal benchmarks (e.g., UNCLOS 1982).

A total of 42 primary documents and 28 peer-reviewed secondary literature sources met these criteria, comprising the final analytical corpus (N = 70), where the unit of analysis is defined as discrete textual extracts—specifically policy clauses, paragraphs, and verbatim speech transcripts—that articulate geopolitical postures, spatial boundaries, and security doctrines. The analytical process was executed in three distinct, sequential stages using NVivo 14 software to ensure theoretical validity and interpretative precision (Miles et al., 2018; Firdaus et al., 2026). Initially, primary texts were ingested into NVivo 14, where deductive coding was applied using pre-established theoretical categories such as "colonial legacy," "sovereignty," and "solidarity," followed by inductive coding to capture emerging operational themes like "hybrid threats," "interoperability," and "digital connectivity" (Maulana, 2026), focusing on how elite actors linguistically construct boundaries between "self" and "other."

Subsequently, a comparative discourse analysis utilized a deconstructive matrix juxtaposing classical Western maritime frameworks (Mahanian commercial sea control and Corbettian land-supportive naval action) against indigenous models—specifically the five

pillars of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) and the three dimensions of its Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14 framework (Alfi & Manullang, 2024). Finally, to evaluate how archipelagic ontology translates into administrative and security practice, the corpus was subjected to Lukman Yudho Prakoso's (2020) policy implementation framework across seven explicit operational dimensions: (1) Integration: Harmonization and structural unification of fragmented maritime agencies. (2) Interaction: Multi-stakeholder communications, regional diplomacy, and joint inter-agency/bilateral operations. (3) Transparency: Real-time sharing and data fusion of maritime intelligence and geospatial assets across agency boundaries. (4) Control: Sovereign enforcement, monitoring, and proactive surveillance of territorial waters and strategic chokepoints. (5) Accountability: Explicit performance metrics, legislative oversight, and transparent auditing of defense procurement and technology acquisitions. (6) Confidentiality: Cyber-defense protocols and protection of sensitive hydrographic, geospatial, and tactical military intelligence against hybrid exploitation. (7) Regulation: Harmonization and legal alignment of overlapping maritime statutes, sectoral mandates, and spatial planning regulations into a unified legal framework (Firdaus et al., 2026; Prakoso, 2021). Throughout this multi-stage analytical process, credibility and methodological rigor were maintained through rigorous source triangulation across legal, diplomatic, and technical texts, ensuring that all interpretative claims remain directly grounded in primary sources (Hervey et al., 2011; Lirola-Delgado, 2019).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

Deconstructing Western Maritime Hegemony: Mahanian and Corbettian Paradigms in Contemporary Context

The hegemony of Western maritime strategic thought is rooted in the universalization of historical experiences that are geographically and structurally distinct from those of postcolonial archipelagic states. To evaluate how these dogmas influence the strategic posture of non-Western nations, one must critically examine the foundational theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan and Sir Julian Corbett, identifying both their core insights and their epistemic limitations when applied to archipelagic domains. Alfred Thayer Mahan's theory of sea power posits that a nation's global influence and economic prosperity are directly dependent on its ability to command the seas and project naval force to protect commercial sea lines of communication (Mahan, 1890; McCranie, 2023). Mahan identified six fundamental elements affecting sea power: geographical position, physical conformation, extent of territory, population size, national character, and character of the government (Koçpınar, 2024). Contemporary rereadings of Mahan emphasize that his work was not merely a call for aggressive naval expansion, but a sophisticated political economy framework designed to secure maritime commerce and international order (Grove, 2021; Sumida, 2014). However, as applied to postcolonial contexts, Mahanian doctrine remains

deeply anchored in the Euro-American imperial experience, where sea control is achieved primarily through fleet concentration and the threat of decisive battle (Grove, 2021; Pramudia, 2025).

Central to Mahan's conceptualization is the construction of the ocean as an expansive, unpopulated void. As Mahan famously argued: In the case under consideration, the navy played the part of such a force upon the supposed desert; but as it acts on an element strange to most writers, as its members have been from time immemorial a strange race apart, without prophets of their own, neither themselves nor their calling understood, its immense determining influence upon the history of that era, and consequently upon the history of world, has been overlooked (Mahan, 1890). This "desert allegory" constructs the sea as a culturally vacant and frictionless highway (*mare liberum*) that acquires political meaning only when navigated or controlled by state-backed naval power (Björnehed, 2022). This Cartesian abstraction separates oceanic spaces from the lived socio-cultural and ecological realities of coastal populations, reflecting a broader Western colonial rationality (Said, 1978; Steinberg, 2001). Under this view, sovereignty is operationalized primarily as external control exercised through concentrated naval platforms (Arto et al., 2019). In contrast to Mahan's focus on fleet concentration and commercial sea control, Sir Julian Corbett offered a more flexible, land-sea integrated framework based on British maritime history (McCranie, 2023). Corbett recognized that naval power rarely achieves political objectives in isolation and stressed that command of the sea is almost always relative rather than absolute (Corbett, 1911; Widen, 2012). Corbett observed: Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided – except in the rarest cases – either by what your army can do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else by the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your army to do (Corbett, 1911). While Corbettian strategy provides valuable insights into joint operations, limited warfare, and strategic flexibility (Till, 2018), its theoretical core remains fundamentally land-centric. By conceptualizing the sea strictly as a medium for influencing land campaigns, Corbettian theory reinforces a binary division between terrestrial sovereignty and oceanic space (Björnehed, 2022; Pramudia, 2025). Contemporary military doctrines continue to reflect this land-centric ontology, such as the U.S. Army's ADP 1-01, which notes that "Humans temporarily transit the air, maritime, and space domains, but they ultimately live on land" (U.S. Department of the Army, 2019). Rather than being entirely obsolete, both Mahanian and Corbettian paradigms exhibit structural limitations when explaining or addressing contemporary "wicked problems" in postcolonial maritime security, such as gray-zone tactics, subsea infrastructure vulnerability, illegal fishing, and environmental degradation (Bateman, 2011; Larsson, 2024). Because these classical doctrines privilege state-centric, high-intensity naval confrontation, relying solely upon them leaves postcolonial states prone to "sea blindness" regarding multi-dimensional threats occurring below the threshold of traditional armed conflict (Bueger & Edmunds, 2017; Bueger & Liebetrau, 2021).

The Archipelagic Ontology: *Wawasan Nusantara* and the Decolonization of Space

To address the epistemic gaps of Western naval doctrines, postcolonial archipelagic states have articulated alternative spatial ontologies rooted in their distinct geographic and historical realities. The primary manifestation of this shift in Southeast Asia is Indonesia's concept of *Wawasan Nusantara* and its legal formulation through the Djuanda Declaration of December 13, 1957 (Kusumaatmadja, 1973; Leifer, 1983; Tsauro, 2017). Prior to 1957, Indonesia's maritime boundaries were dictated by the Dutch colonial regime via the Territoriale Zeeën en Maritieme Kringen Ordonnantie (TZMKO) of 1939. The TZMKO stipulated a narrow 3-nautical-mile territorial sea limit around each island, treating intervening body of waters—such as the Java and Banda Seas—as international waters (high seas) (Butcher, 2009). This colonial legal framework fragmented the archipelago into isolated landmasses separated by international corridors, enabling foreign military and commercial vessels to operate unhindered within the heart of the island nation (Anand, 1981; Danusaputro, 1980).

The Djuanda Declaration radically dismantled this imperial cartography. Promulgated by Prime Minister Djuanda Kartawidjaja, the official government declaration asserted: All waters surrounding, between, and connecting the islands constituting the Indonesian archipelago, regardless of their width or dimension, are integral parts of the inland or national waters of the Republic of Indonesia and subject to its absolute sovereignty (Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 1957). This declaration inverted Western Cartesian spatial logic. Rather than treating the ocean as a barrier or a vacuum of jurisdiction, the Djuanda Declaration conceptualized water as an integrative medium binding over 17,000 islands into a singular, indivisible sovereign domain (Prasetyo et al., 2019; Syatauw, 1961). Following a 25-year diplomatic effort led by Indonesian jurists, this archipelagic concept was formally codified internationally under Part IV of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) (Kusumaatmadja, 1982; UNCLOS, 1982). Table 1 summarizes the conceptual and operational differences between classical Western maritime strategy and the indigenous archipelagic ontology.

Table 1. Conceptual Comparison Between Western Maritime Strategy and Indigenous Archipelagic Ontology

Dimension	Western Sea Power Paradigm (Mahan/Corbett)	Indigenous Archipelagic Ontology <i>Wawasan Nusantara</i>
Ontological Conception of the Sea	The sea as a "desert," frictionless highway, or void to be dominated.	The sea as a vital "connective vein," lived space, and holistic domain <i>Tanah Air</i> .
Sovereignty Framework	Cartesian boundary-making; exclusive control; state-centered hard power.	Unified land-water space; relational sovereignty; collective stewardship.

Strategic Objective	Decisive fleet battle; offensive sea denial; commerce suppression.	Maintaining national unity; securing maritime connectivity; sustainable resource management.
Diplomatic Orientation	Zero-sum regional competition; balance of power.	Deconial solidarity; cooperative diplomacy; joint development.
Implementation Model	Sectoral, navy-dominant command structures.	Integrated, multi-agency, and technology-driven governance (Prakoso's IITCA).

(Source: Author's synthesis, 2026)

The comparative synthesis presented in Table 1 directly addresses the second research question (RQ2) by illustrating how *Wawasan Nusantara* functions not merely as a legal redefinition of maritime boundaries, but as a fundamental ontological shift. By transitioning the conception of oceanic space from an empty, frictionless void (Mahanian paradigm) to a lived, interconnected domain *Tanah Air*, the archipelagic ontology replaces Eurocentric zero-sum power projection with an integrated model of domain stewardship. Consequently, this reframing dismantles inherited colonial spatial divisions, re-engineering national maritime strategy away from rigid naval sea denial toward unified, multi-agency governance and cooperative regional diplomacy (Danusaputro, 1980; Leifer, 1983; Maulana, 2026). At the core of this post-Western ontology is the linguistic and cultural concept of *Tanah Air*, which defines national identity through the indissoluble synthesis of terrestrial and oceanic domains (Danusaputro, 1980; Darusman, 2018). Rather than treating maritime space as an external perimeter, the archipelagic ontology conceptualizes the sea as the vital "connective vein" of the state, essential for national cohesion, economic development, and sovereign defense (Kusumaatmadja, 1973; Alfi & Manullang, 2024). This indigenous maritime consciousness was prominently articulated by President Sukarno during his address at the National Maritime Conference *Munas Maritim* in 1963: Each and every one of us must realize that Indonesia cannot become strong, prosperous, and secure unless we master the oceans, unless we return to being a maritime nation, a seafaring people as we were in our historical past (President of the Republic of Indonesia, 1963). Sukarno's rhetoric outlines an early postcolonial attempt to dismantle Eurocentric, land-centric biases, asserting that state survival and prosperity are intrinsically tied to oceanic mastery (Prasetyo et al., 2019). Decades later, this foundational maritime identity was formally operationalized under President Joko Widodo through the Global Maritime Fulcrum *Poros Maritim Dunia* doctrine, launched at the 9th East Asia Summit in Naypyidaw on November 13, 2014 (Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, 2015; Sambhi, 2015). The Global Maritime Fulcrum translated archipelagic ontology into state policy across five strategic pillars: Rebuilding Indonesia's historical maritime culture; Managing marine resources and securing food sovereignty; Developing maritime infrastructure and inter-island connectivity *Tol Laut*; Advancing proactive maritime diplomacy; and Strengthening naval defense

capabilities along critical sea lanes (Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs, 2015; Sambhi, 2015; Maulana, 2026). Through this framework, Indonesia projected its archipelagic ontology onto the international stage, asserting its role as a pivotal Indo-Pacific maritime power while offering a post-Western alternative to great-power strategic rivalries in the region (Alfi & Manullang, 2024; Maulana, 2026).

Postcolonial Maritime Diplomacy and President Prabowo's Narrative of Solidarity

While the Global Maritime Fulcrum under Joko Widodo primarily focused on economic connectivity, infrastructure (such as the "Sea Highway" or "Tol Laut"), and domestic resource protection, the transition to the post-2024 administration of President Prabowo Subianto has marked a significant conceptual and rhetorical shift in Indonesian maritime diplomacy (Maulana, 2026; Arto et al., 2019). Rather than relying on a purely pragmatic, legalistic approach to border management, the Prabowo administration has discursively mobilized a decolonial narrative of solidarity that directly operationalizes the archipelagic ontology (Maulana, 2026). This decolonial turn is most clearly illustrated in Indonesia's handling of the long-standing Ambalat dispute with Malaysia over a highly sensitive, resource-rich 15,000 square kilometer maritime block in the Sulawesi Sea (Maulana, 2026). Historically, the dispute had been characterized by severe military standoffs, naval posturing, and nationalist chest-thumping, which nearly escalated into open conflict in 2005 and 2009 (Maulana, 2026). Under previous administrations, the dispute was framed strictly in terms of UNCLOS legal provisions, territorial defense, and military deterrence (Maulana, 2026).

However, President Prabowo Subianto has radically reframed the Ambalat dispute by deconstructing its underlying colonial origins. In his landmark State Address at the Annual MPR Session on August 15, 2025, President Prabowo explicitly characterized the border dispute as an artificial "colonial wound" designed by European imperial powers to divide the region: "This issue is a legacy of colonialism, an inheritance from foreign occupiers. The Dutch and the British arrived and arbitrarily drew boundary lines as they pleased". (Subianto, 2025; Maulana, 2026). This statement performs a profound Saidian inversion of the dominant geopolitical discourse (Said, 1978; Maulana, 2026). By attributing the dispute's origins to the arbitrary, cartographic drawings of the Dutch and British empires (such as the Anglo-Dutch Treaty of 1824 and the Boundary Agreement of 1891), Prabowo externalizes the conflict (Maulana, 2026). The dispute is no longer constructed as an inherent, natural conflict between Indonesia and Malaysia, but as an external, imperial imposition that continues to divide the region (Maulana, 2026). To counter this colonial imposition, Prabowo discursively positions Malaysia not as an adversarial "Other" encroaching on Indonesian sovereignty, but as a "fellow inheritor" of colonial injustice and a member of the same postcolonial family: "We must not be naive. We must stop allowing ourselves to be played off against one another." (Subianto, 2025; Maulana, 2026).

By invoking the concept of common heritage, this discourse transforms the bilateral relationship from one of cartographic rivalry into a shared space of postcolonial solidarity

(Maulana, 2026). This rhetorical move occupies what Homi Bhabha (2004) conceptualizes as the "third space" a productive, hybrid, and in-between discursive space where postcolonial states can renegotiate their underlying colonial heritage and construct new forms of political subjectivity (Bhabha, 2004; Maulana, 2026). This decolonial discourse has been translated into concrete, practical diplomatic action. During a high-level bilateral meeting at Istana Merdeka on June 27, 2025, President Prabowo and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim formally agreed to decouple resource management from rigid sovereignty claims by implementing a joint development (JD) framework in the disputed Ambalat block (Secretariat of the President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2025). As President Prabowo explicitly stated: "Taking the Ambalat issue as an example, we have agreed that while we incrementally resolve the underlying legal disputes, we aim to initiate economic cooperation through what we define as joint development". (Subianto, 2025; Maulana, 2026). This joint development proposal represents a direct challenge to the Western, Westphalian concept of exclusive territorial sovereignty (Anghie, 2006; Maulana, 2026). Conventional middle-power diplomacy operates within a Western legalistic framework, treating colonial boundary treaties as neutral and authoritative starting points for resolution, which often leads to "upturned subsidiarity" the tendency of regional states to hand over dispute resolution to global, Western-dominated institutions like the International Court of Justice (Koldunova, 2018; Maulana, 2026).

In contrast, Indonesia's decolonial maritime diplomacy reframes the unresolved boundary as a "shared colonial wound" that cannot be resolved through inherited cartographic instruments (Maulana, 2026). The joint development framework allows both nations to exercise sovereignty relationally and collectively, shifting the dispute logic from territorial contestation to shared, sustainable stewardship (Maulana, 2026). By presenting this decolonial narrative at the 47th ASEAN Summit retreat in Kuala Lumpur on October 26, 2025, President Prabowo has actively sought to "decolonize" regional norms, urging ASEAN member states to strengthen their institutional capacity and resist great power polarization in the Indo-Pacific (Mawangi, 2025; Maulana, 2026).

Institutional Transformation and Policy Implementation: Prakoso's IITCA and Bueger's Matrix

The practical operationalization of an indigenous archipelagic ontology requires a radical transformation of domestic maritime security governance. Archipelagic security cannot be achieved through fragmented, sector-specific agencies operating on Western models of hard-power sea denial. Instead, it demands a holistic, integrated, and technology-driven policy implementation framework. To analyze and optimize Indonesian maritime governance, this study deploys Lukman Yudho Prakoso's (2020) policy implementation theory—specifically his seven-dimension framework (Integration, Interaction, Transparency, Control, Accountability, Confidentiality, and Regulation)—and synthesizes it with Christian Bueger's

(2015) Maritime Security Matrix (Firdaus et al., 2026, p. 349). Christian Bueger (2015) argues that maritime security must be understood as an interactive matrix of four interconnected dimensions: (1) Sea Power (national security, naval defense); (2) Economic Development (the blue economy, maritime trade); (3) Human Security (the safety of coastal populations, seafarers, and migrants); and (4) Marine Environment (ecological preservation, marine pollution management) (Bueger, 2015; Firdaus et al., 2026). In an archipelagic state like Indonesia, these four dimensions are highly interdependent: an oil spill in the Malacca Strait directly threatens the blue economy of local fisheries, while illegal fishing by foreign vessels in the North Natuna Sea threatens both national sovereignty (Sea Power) and the human security of local fishermen (Alfi & Manullang, 2024). To systematically unpack how these operational demands can be translated into actionable institutional mechanisms, Table 2 maps the specific dimensions, operational definitions, and key governance instruments of Prakoso's implementation framework within the archipelagic context.

Table 2. Dimensions and Governance Instruments of Prakoso's IITCA Framework

Prakoso's IITCA Dimension	Operational Definition in Archipelagic Context	Key Technological & Governance Instruments
Integration	Harmonization of fragmented maritime agencies.	National Maritime Security Council; Single Agency coordination initiatives.
Interaction	Multi-stakeholder communications, regional patrols, and joint bilateral operations.	Indomalphi joint patrols; ASEAN Coast Guard Forum; IORA Jakarta Concord.
Transparency	Real-time sharing of maritime intelligence and geospatial data across sector boundaries.	National Integrated Geospatial Information System; AIS & SAR satellite data fusion.
Control	Sovereign enforcement and monitoring of territorial waters and strategic chokepoints.	Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) in Sunda/Lombok Straits; AI-driven dark ship tracking.
Accountability	Clear performance indicators, auditing of defense procurement, and legislative oversight.	Bakamla's Maritime Security Index (IKL); Independent defense technology audits.
Confidentiality	Protection of sensitive maritime geospatial data, tactical intelligence, and national defense assets against cyber and hybrid threats.	Encryption protocols for national maritime data systems; secure military satellite communication channels.
Regulation	Alignment and harmonization of overlapping maritime laws, regulations, and agency mandates into a unified legal framework.	Omnibus Law on Maritime Security; national spatial planning updates (RTRWN/RZWP3K).

(Source: Author's synthesis, 2026)

The structural breakdown in Table 2 directly addresses the secondary research question regarding the institutional and technological mechanisms necessary to operationalize an archipelagic governance framework. The key finding from this synthesis is that translating an archipelagic ontology into practice requires a shift from isolated agency operations to a technology-enabled, cross-sectoral ecosystem across all seven dimensions of implementation. By linking each of Prakoso's dimensions to specific instruments—such as

real-time satellite data fusion for transparency, AI-driven dark ship tracking for control, and legal omnibus harmonization for regulation—the framework demonstrates that modern archipelagic governance relies as much on comprehensive policy and intelligence integration as it does on traditional naval posture. Evaluating Indonesia's contemporary maritime governance through Prakoso's (2020) model reveals both critical advancements and lingering structural bottlenecks:

Integration: Indonesia currently suffers from a fragmented, multi-agency maritime enforcement structure, involving the Navy (TNI AL), the Maritime Security Agency (Bakamla), the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP), the Ministry of Transportation, Polairud, and Customs (Prakoso, 2020; Firdaus et al., 2026). This "multi-agency, multi-task" system has historically led to overlapping jurisdictions, data fragmentation, and slow response times to hybrid threats (Firdaus et al., 2026). While the government has sought to strengthen Bakamla as the de facto Indonesian Coast Guard and establish a "one-roof" enforcement system, institutional rivalries and legislative ambiguities continue to prevent a transition to a streamlined, "single-agency" model (Handrisal et al., 2026; Febriyanto et al., 2026).

Interaction: Indonesia has demonstrated strong interactive capacity at the regional level, leading initiatives such as the ASEAN Coast Guard Forum, the Indomalphi joint patrols (with Malaysia and the Philippines in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas), and the ratification of the Jakarta Concord under the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) (Maharani, 2021; Alf & Manullang, 2024).

Transparency: Achieving real-time maritime domain awareness across vast archipelagic waters requires seamless data sharing across sector boundaries. Research by Ivanhoe et al. (2026) and Febriyanto et al. (2026) outlines a revolutionary design for an Integrated National Geospatial Information System that serves as a Decision Support System. By fusing data from Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), synthetic aperture radar (SAR) satellite imagery, optical sensors, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) into a unified cloud-based architecture, this system eliminates intelligence silos between competing agencies.

Control: To convert data transparency into sovereign enforcement across 6.4 million square kilometers of ocean and strategic chokepoints, Indonesia must move beyond resource-intensive surface patrols. Implementing AI-driven "dark ship" detection and automated Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) in the Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits enables predictive spatial monitoring and targeted interception of non-compliant foreign vessels (Redita et al., 2020; Febriyanto et al., 2026).

Accountability: Achieving accountability in archipelagic defense requires both independent defense technology audits to prevent endemic procurement corruption and a commitment to domestic defense-industrial self-reliance under the "Defend ID" state holding enterprise (Madrohim & Prakoso, 2021; Matthews et al., 2025). Indonesia's defense acquisition has historically suffered from underfunding, with military expenditure hovering at a critically low 0.7% of GDP, forcing a reliance on expensive foreign loans and secondhand

equipment (Matthews et al., 2025, p. 125, 127). The development of customized, domestic naval platforms—such as the Nagapasa-class submarines co-produced with South Korea and the Red White frigates constructed by PT PAL—is essential for building a "Minimum Essential Force" capable of executing a robust sea denial strategy at key choke points like the Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits (Prakoso, 2021; Matthews et al., 2025).

Confidentiality: As maritime governance shifts toward digital, cloud-based geospatial platforms and shared inter-agency intelligence networks, securing sensitive hydrographic and tactical communication channels becomes paramount (Ivanhoe et al., 2026). Without robust military-grade encryption and cyber-defense infrastructure, shared operational databases remain vulnerable to foreign intelligence exploitation and hybrid cyber-attacks aimed at compromising critical maritime surveillance systems.

Regulation: The primary legal bottleneck in Indonesian maritime security remains the proliferation of conflicting legislative mandates across different ministries and agencies (Firdaus et al., 2026). Establishing a comprehensive Omnibus Law on Maritime Security *UU Keamanan Laut* is critical to resolving jurisdictional overlaps, streamlining enforcement authorities under a single coordinating structure, and updating spatial planning frameworks (*RTRWN/RZWP3K*) to align with contemporary archipelagic threats.

Synthesizing Prakoso's framework with Bueger's matrix allows Indonesia to move beyond the traditional, Mahanian focus on battleship-centric naval power toward a holistic model of "archipelagic resilience" that secures the national domain while preserving the delicate marine ecosystems of the Indo-Pacific (Alfi & Manullang, 2024; Firdaus et al., 2026).

Theoretical and Epistemological Contributions

This study makes a significant theoretical contribution to critical geopolitics and postcolonial International Relations (IR) by demonstrating how an indigenous archipelagic ontology can be operationalized into a modern administrative framework. Historically, maritime security literature has been dominated by Western, blue-water power concepts—predominantly Mahanian commercial sea control and Corbettian amphibious land support—which treat oceans as open highways for power projection and capital accumulation (Grove, 2021; McCranie, 2023). These frameworks inherently marginalize the spatial and ecological realities of archipelagic states. By synthesizing Lukman Yudho Prakoso's (2020) seven implementation dimensions (IITCA) with Christian Bueger's (2015) Maritime Security Matrix, this research bridges the gap between decolonial discourse analysis and empirical policy implementation. It demonstrates that archipelagic resilience requires moving beyond state-centric sea denial toward an integrated, cross-sectoral governance ecosystem that simultaneously protects sovereignty (Sea Power), coastal livelihoods (Human Security), trade (Economic Development), and fragile ecosystems (Marine Environment) (Alfi & Manullang, 2024; Firdaus et al., 2026). To resolve the implementation bottlenecks identified in the empirical analysis, Indonesian policymakers should prioritize four strategic interventions:

Legislative Harmonization via an Omnibus Law (UU Keamanan Laut): The Indonesian Parliament (DPR) and Executive must enact a comprehensive Omnibus Maritime Security Law to eliminate conflicting ministerial mandates, clearly designate Bakamla as the sole national Coast Guard agency, and unify overlapping enforcement authorities under a single operational command (Febriyanto et al., 2026; Firdaus et al., 2026).

Deployment of a Unified Digital Decision Support System (DSS): To actualize the Transparency and Control dimensions, the government must mandate the full operationalization of an Integrated National Geospatial Information System. Fusing satellite SAR, AIS, optical imagery, and AI-driven dark ship tracking into a shared cloud-based platform will dismantle inter-agency intelligence silos and enable real-time interception at strategic chokepoints (Ivanhoe et al., 2026; Redita et al., 2020).

Defense Procurement Reform and Industrial Self-Reliance: Addressing the Accountability dimension requires increasing defense spending beyond the historical ~0.7% GDP threshold and expanding domestic naval shipbuilding capacity through the "Defend ID" holding enterprise. Co-production programs (such as the Red White frigates) are critical for securing the Sunda, Lombok, and Makassar Straits without over-relying on foreign military financing (Madrohim & Prakoso, 2021; Matthews et al., 2025).

CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS

The dominance of traditional, western-centric maritime security paradigms—specifically the offensive, great power naval dogmas of Alfred Thayer Mahan and the land-centric strategic instrumentalism of Sir Julian Corbett—has historically colonized the geostrategic imaginary of postcolonial states, leaving them epistemically ill-equipped to manage their own maritime territories. By deconstructing these dogmas, this article has demonstrated that western sea power theories are structurally designed for territorial conquest and great power resource extraction, treating the sea as a frictionless cartesian void or a secondary, instrumental theater of war. In contrast, the indigenous archipelagic ontology, formally encapsulated in Indonesia's doctrine of *Wawasan Nusantara* and asserted through the historic djuanda declaration of 1957, offers a powerful, decolonial alternative. By conceptualizing the sea as a vital "connective vein" and synthesizing land and water into a unified, holistic sovereign domain *Tanah Air*, the archipelagic ontology redefines sovereignty relationally and collectively. Under the contemporary post-2024 administration of President Prabowo Subianto, this ontology has been dynamically translated into postcolonial maritime diplomacy, reframing historic border disputes like Ambalat not as zero-sum security contests, but as "shared colonial wounds" that can be relationally healed through cooperative joint development. Finally, the translation of this archipelagic ontology into concrete administrative and operational policy is optimized through the application of Lukman Yudho Prakoso's IITCA (integrative, interactive, transparency, control, accountability) framework. By integrating advanced artificial intelligence and geospatial big data within a unified decision support system, archipelagic states can dramatically enhance their maritime

domain awareness, moving from resource-intensive conventional patrolling to risk-based spatial analysis. Ultimately, this article re-theorizes maritime security by offering a post-western, decolonial framework that prioritizes human security, ecological sustainability, and cooperative regional stewardship over offensive sea denial and zero-sum command.

Based on the empirical and theoretical findings of this study, four targeted policy recommendations are proposed: (1) Overcoming institutional fragmentation: to address the severe inter-agency overlap identified within the integration dimension of prakoso's model, the Indonesian government should streamline its multi-agency maritime enforcement system into a unified national sea and coast guard structure. This requires legally consolidating bakamla, the ministry of marine affairs and fisheries (kkp), and the marine police under a single legislative and operational mandate. (2) Accelerating geospatial data fusion: grounded in the study's findings regarding surveillance vulnerabilities in choke points, priority must be given to constructing an integrated decision support system (dss). The Indonesian government should build an integrated national geospatial information system that executes real-time data fusion combining automatic identification system (ais), synthetic aperture radar (sar) satellite imagery, and unmanned aerial vehicle (uav) feeds to secure the north natuna sea and Indonesian archipelagic sea lanes (alki). (3) Institutionalizing decolonial maritime diplomacy: extending the analytical insights from the postcolonial resolution of the ambalat dispute, asean should formally adopt joint development and cooperative stewardship as normative diplomatic templates for managing overlapping territorial claims, thereby preventing "upturned subsidiarity" and mitigating great power polarization in southeast Asia. (4) Enhancing defense acquisition oversight: to reinforce the control and accountability dimensions of prakoso's framework, the ministry of defense should establish an independent defense technology auditing body. This entity will systematically evaluate operational readiness, cost structures, and offset implementations across domestic strategic shipyards operating under the defend id holding company.

While this study offers a contextual and theoretically informed re-theorization of maritime security, several methodological and empirical limitations must be acknowledged: (1) Methodological and interpretive bias: the analysis relies predominantly on qualitative discourse analysis of elite political statements, state addresses, and doctrine documents. The study did not incorporate formal inter-coder reliability testing during the qualitative coding process, which introduces potential interpretive bias in the contextual analysis of state rhetoric. (2) Document selection scope: the corpus of analyzed texts was selected based on high-level state doctrines and executive policy declarations. Consequently, the study does not fully capture the micro-level operational perspectives of mid-level naval commanders and frontline maritime enforcement officers. (3) Empirical validation constraints: the proposed ai-driven dss architecture and joint development models remain theoretically synthesized. Further empirical, quantitative research is required to evaluate the actual operational performance of automated geospatial surveillance systems and the socio-economic yields of joint development agreements in contested maritime zones. (4)

Geographic generalizability: while this research focuses on indonesia as a foundational case study for archipelagic thought, the applicability of this decolonial framework to other archipelagic and island nations in the pacific, caribbean, and indian ocean requires comparative empirical verification to establish broader global applicability.

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